FAA issues airworthiness directive for Cirrus Vision Jet parachute system

Photo of Vision Jet from Cirrus Aircraft

A new FAA airworthiness directive (AD) will take effect on Tuesday for all Cirrus SF50 Vision Jets. The FAA issued this AD after reports of an accident and the uncommanded activation of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) autopilot mode during flight. The FAA issued this AD to address the potentially unsafe condition on the aircraft and it affects 365 planes on the U.S. registry.

The AD will require a boost to the avionics on the Vision Jet in configuration mode, the inhibiting of the CAPS autopilot, the fabricating and installation of information placards, a revision for the existing airplane flight manual and the revision of the airworthiness limitations section of the airplane maintenance manual or the instructions for continued airworthiness. Some planes will only require the modification of wiring to remove the CAPS power timer functionality.

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It will take effect on Tuesday and comments are being accepted until April 20. The FAA is considering this an interim action since the manufacturer is currently working on a modification to address the problem. The FAA has worked up all known costs and noted that some of the projected costs may be included under warranty. The AD applies to all Vision Jet models, all serial numbers and any category and more information for specific serial number ranges are outlined in the Federal Register.

The FAA had received a report about a Vision Jet being involved in an accident with multiple flight control issues occurring after takeoff and causing the pilot to manually deploy the CAPS parachute. The FAA notes that there was no indication the pilot had received a crew alert system message to indicate a CAPS malfunction. The corrosion in the CAPS power timer circuit, which is part of the CAPS autopilot control mode circuit, may have also mistakenly sent a signal to the CAPS control box and activated the CAPS autopilot mode. The CAPS malfunction was found to have contributed to the crash and multiple reports came in about corrosion on CAPS power timer circuits.

Estimated costs listed in the AD

Another report stated that an autopilot auto-throttle malfunction caused a Vision Jet to pitch up during a climb, shortly after takeoff, requiring manual intervention from the pilot. Both events took place shortly after takeoff and at less than 1,000 feet above ground level. The activation of the CAPS autopilot mode can cause the plane to introduce an uncommanded 30-degree pitch upward at a g-force of about 1.9g and potentially cause the plane to stall in a critical phase of flight if the autopilot is not disengaged.

Once the AD goes into place, owners will have a window of time to comply with the necessary inspections and changes. Within 25 hours of the AD effective date, owners must make the proper revisions to maintenance manuals. The FAA outlines all timelines and procedures for owners in the Federal Register.